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ABANDONMENT OF THE GRANTED RIGHT
TO DRILL FOR OIL AND GAS:
GERHARD v. STEPHENS'
One of the most difficult problems in the development of oil and gas
law has been the determination of the exact nature of the property rights
governing the ownership and extraction of petroleum minerals. Various,
theories of ownership were developed in the United States in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries: (1) absolute ownership of all oil and gas
in place,2 (2) a qualified theory of ownership with certain rights shared in
common with other owners above the pool, and (3) a theory of non-owner-
ship, or the exclusive right to drill for oil.3
The majority of the major oil producing states had already considered
the question of ownership before petroleum production in California be-
gan to be important in the early twentieth century. The earliest California
case to consider the ownership theories was Acme Oil and Mining Co. v.
Williams4 in 1903. The court decided that before most property rights to
the oil could attach, the owner would have to reduce the fugacious sub-
stance to possession. In Graciosa Oil Co. v. County of Santa Barbara5 the
California Supreme Court, operating from- the theory of absolute ownership
of oil and gas in place, held that a lease to drill for the oil and gas was a
servitude on the land. The court ruled that for purposes of taxation such
a servitude was a chattel real.
Until the development of the Santa Fe Springs oil field in 1928, the
theory of ownership of oil and gas in situ was accepted as the rule by
California courts. Because of the tremendous waste in the operation of
that field, the legislature began passing laws, aimed at controlling oil and
gas production. To further the purposes of these laws, the courts began to
modify the doctrine of absolute ownership in place. 6 "
In 1935 the Supreme Court of California decided two landmark oil
1 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612.
2 This theory is derived from the old common law maxim: cujus est solum, ejlus
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the
sky and to the depths). BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1951).
3 Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas, 31 CALm. L. REV. 357 (1943); Hightower,, Thq
'Oil and Gas Lease in California, 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 424 (1956). For a survey of
the present diversity in ownership theories in the United States, see 1 H. WiLLTAMS &
C. MEYERS, Om .ND GAS LAW § 203 (1964).
4 140 Cal. 681, 74 P. 296 (1903).
r 155 Cal. 140, 99 P. 483 (1909).
6 Colby, supra note 3, at 386-93.
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and gas cases which are the foundation of the present theory of ownership
in California. In Callahan v. Martin the Supreme Court reviewed in great
detail all of the theories of ownership. The case concerned a lease granted
for a term of years with the provision that if oil were found, the lease
would continue so long as oil should be produced. The court decided
that such a lease created for the lessee an interest or estate in real prop-
erty. The interest thus created was a profit a prendre, which is an in-
corporeal hereditament, i.e., a directly inheritable right arising from and
connected with real property.8
Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. WaldenO9 more clearly defined the doc-
trine of non-ownership of fugacious minerals until reduced to possession.
The court found that the owner had the exclusive right to drill for oil on
his land. The owner could grant the valuable right to another. Such a
granted right to remove a part of the substance of the land was an interest
in real property, a profit a prendre, an incorporeal hereditament. Such a
grant created an estate in real property which would be a chattel real if for
a term of years or a freehold interest, an estate in fee if unlimited in
duration.' 0
Thus in 1935 the two major decisions characterized the ownership of oil
and gas rights both as an incorporeal hereditament and as a fee simple in-
terest in real property. In dealing with many problems of oil and gas
property rights, the courts followed both aspects of this characterization
prior to 1968. When the issue of abandonment arose concerning the
rights, the dual characterization posed a real legal problem. Were the off
and gas rights incorporeal hereditaments that could be abandoned? Or
were the rights granted fee simle interests in real property that could not
be abandoned? With Gerhard v. Stephens"l the conflict seemingly inherent
in such a dual characterization of the property rights was resolved.
In Gerhard v. Stephens there were multiple parties, many issues, and an
extremely complex factual situation. Only the facts directly pertinent to
the major issues, the nature of the oil and gas interests and the abandon-
ment thereof, are included here.'
2
7 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935)..
8 Id. at 118, 43 P.2d at 792.
9 4 Cal. .2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935).
10 Id. at 649, 52 P.2d at 243.
11 68 Cal. 2d -, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
12 There were many issues litigated .in the case including the nature of the" oil
and gas interest, the abandonment of such interests, the adverse possession of mineral
interests, adverse possession by a cotenant, the effect of prior quiet title actions, the
conclusiveness of judgments, the occurrence of laches, the right to examine adverse
witnesses, the nature of a class action, the effect of a foreclosure judgment, the alleged
unlawful practice of law by plaintiff Gerhard, and the assertion of invalid acquisition
of claims by Gerhard.
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The property in dispute in the Gerhard case was the petroleum under-
lying section 31, which was part of the Syncline Ranch, Abrams and
Brandt acquired the disputed property in fee simple in 1905. They formed
a partnership and with Weber organized two corporations, Ashurst Oil,
Land and Development Company (Ashurst) and California Oil Products
Company (COP). The partnership conveyed to the corporations the
petroleum and asphalt rights underlying section 31 together with the right
to enter and extract those minerals forever. Neither corporation found oil.
Both forfeited their corporate charters, Ashurst in 1912, and COP in 1915.
The partners then owned the surface estate of section 31, the partner-
ship holdings of corporate stock, and their individual corporate stock hold-
ings. In an action in 1917 the court quieted title to the surface estate in
Abrams and Brandt and decreed that all 148 stockholders in the two cor-
porations were co-owners of the petroleum mineral estate in proportion to
their stock holdings. Following a partnership accounting in 1919, Brandt
acquired the partnership interests in both the surface estate and the mineral
estate. The Frusetta-Cornwell defendants acquired by deed from Brandt the
surface estate and the partnership mineral interests. By acquiring the un-
divided fractional mineral interests of the partnership, they became tenants
in common with the other mineral owners under the 1917 quiet title decree.
All plaintiffs were successors in interest to the latter mineral owners.
The Frusetta-Cornwell defendants retained and used the property to the
present time. On two occasions they brought quiet title actions to clear the
outstanding interests in the land. In neither action were plaintiffs or their
predecessors named or served with notice, although their existence and
rights were on record and should have been known by the defendants
from their deed and from an earlier decree quieting title in the corporate
stockholders. The defendants twice issued and recorded mineral leases
on the property without any notice to the plaintiffs other than the construc-
tive notice afforded by recording.
In 1956 Shell Oil Company discovered oil on the property under a lease
made by the defendants. Plaintiff Gerhard learned of the strike and in-
vestigated the history of the property. He approached the successors of
certain stockholders and obtained some claims. He then commenced an
action to quiet title against the Shell Oil Company and the Frusetta-Corn-
well interests. The plaintiffs in the other quiet title actions were the heirs
and successors in interest to the individual holdings of Abrams, Brandt,
Weber, and the former stockholders of the defunct corporations. There
was no dispute about the right of the defendants to make any mineral lease
because all plaintiffs conceded that the defendants had an undivided, frac-
tional mineral interest. At issue were the mineral property rights which
the plaintiffs maintained were still theirs despite their long nonuser.
The trial court held inter alia that by forty-seven years of nonuser, the
plaintiffs abandoned their interests in the petroleum. In so holding, the
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trial court followed Callahan and characterized those interests as incorporeal
hereditaments, which could be abandoned. The court of appeal reversed
the challenged ruling and held that the right to drill for oil granted in per-
petuity was a fee interest in real property and, as such, could not be di-
vested by abandonment. In reversing the trial court, it rested its decision
on the Dabney-Johnston opinion that the exclusive right to drill, unlimited
in duration, created a fee simple title. The court of appeal held that the
two Frusetta-Cornwell quiet title actions did not bar the plaintiffs' claims
because neither action specifically covered the severed fee interest. All
actions against the Shell Oil Company were decided in its favor. Only the
Frusetta-Cornwell defendants remained when appeal was taken to the
California Supreme Court.
The most significant issue of the case, and the one on which most of
the major determinations of the courts depended, was the nature of the
interest in oil and gas. Was the interest a fee simple interest in real prop-
erty which could not be lost by abandonment, or was it an incorporeal
hereditament which could be so lost? The California Supreme Court held
that the severed petroleum interest was a profit a prendre, an incorporeal
hereditament, and could be abandoned. The court stated that there was
substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that certain plain-
tiffs had abandoned their interests, but there was no such evidence
against the remaining plaintiffs. The court ruled that the Frusetta-Corn-
well quiet title decrees did not bar the plaintiffs' claims.
In so holding, the Supreme Court decided which of its 1935 decisions
would govern: the characterization of the right as a profit a prendre, an
incorporeal hereditament, or as an estate in real property, a fee. The
court accomplished this by defining the term "fee" as two separate con-
cepts. In one sense "fee" may be used to describe all of the possessory
and corporeal rights of ownership in real property. 13 In the other sense
the word "fee" is the interest of an estate of inheritance, a description
of the duration of the interest.14  The court decided that the second
meaning was the one intended by the earlier cases. Both cases had
used the term "fee" to indicate that the rights involved were of unlimited
duration rather than for a term of years. Callahan had equated severance
from the realty with the possessory ownership of oil, not with the duration of
the right to drill.' 5
The court ruled that both the nature of the interests and their duration
determined the rights involved. In Gerhard, although the duration of the
interest made it a fee, an inheritable property right, its nature made it a
profit a prendre, an incorporeal -hereditament. Such profits are like ease-
ments, and the courts have described and treated both identically.'6 Prior
'3 68 Cal. 2d 864, 884, 442 P.2d 692, 709, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 629 (1968).
14 Id. at 885, 442 P.2d at 709, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
'5 Id. at 885, 442 P.2d at 709-10, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
16 Costa v. Fawcett, 202 Cal. App. 2d 695, 21 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1962).
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to the Gerhard decision, no California court had ruled that a perpetual
profit could be abandoned. The court in Gerhard decided that the rule
that applied to granted perpetual easements should by analogy apply to
granted perpetual profits. Such easements and profits can be abandoned.
Abandonment extinguishes the right, and the dominant estate then ceases
to exist and is merged with the servient one.17
To find that there has been an abandonment of a granted perpetual profit
or easement, there must be a showing that the owner had the intent to
abandon coupled with a long nonuser of the profit.' 8 Certain plaintiffs
in the case manifested their intent to abandon their property rights in 1914
at the closing of the estate containing the corporate stock by refusing to
accept the stock in order to escape the risk of liability for corporate
debts. None of the other plaintiffs ever manifested any intent not to keep
their property rights. They merely did nothing for forty-seven years. The
court provided the following guideline for future cases considering possible
abandonment:
In order to protect the owner of an unlimited profit a prendre or other incor-
poreal hereditament against "involuntary" abandonment under circumstances in
which conflicting inferences may be drawn from his nonuser we hold that the
trial court must find either that the owner's future use of the right could result
only from a palpably unsound business judgment [footnote omitted] or that
the owner has given a further indication of his intent to abandon.19
Gerhard v. Stephens has now defined the nature of the property interest
in oil and gas by resolving the apparent conflict generated by the dual
characterizations in the Callahan and Dabney-Johnston cases. One of the
most important effects of the decision is that it opens the possibility of clear-
ing long-dormant mineral interests and of freeing the surface estate from the
servitude. Certainly the court based its decision in part on the policy con-
siderations of clearing titles and making property more readily alienable.
20
It might also have been attempting to bring California more closely into
line with those states having special statutes terminating dormant oil and
gas interests.
21
17 68 Cal. 2d 864, 887, 442 P.2d 692, 711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 631 (1968). The cases
holding that easements granted perpetually can be abandoned are People v. Southern
Pacific Co., 172 Cal. 692, 158 P. 177 (1916); Smith v. Worn, 93 Cal. 206, 28 P. 94
(1892); Buechner v. Jonas, 228 Cal. App. 2d 127, 39 Ca.l Rptr. 298 (1964); Lake
Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R., 206 Cal. App. 2d 421, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1962); Ocean Shore R.R. v. Doelger, 179 Cal. App. 2d 222, 3 Cal. Rptr. 706
(1960).
I8 68 Cal. 2d 864, 890, 442 P.2d 692, 712-15, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 632-35 (1968).
19 Id. at 895, 442 P.2d at 716, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
20 WmILL Ms & MEYBRS, supra note 3, § 210.1 (1964); Smith, Methods for Facil-
tating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral
Interests, 43 TEx. L. REv. 129 (1964).
21 Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 888 n.21, 442 P.2d 692, 711 n.21, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 631 n.21 (1968). The court takes note of LA. STAT. ANN. CIV. CoDa
arts. 789, 3546 (1952, 1953) (10 yrs.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1163(1) (Supp. 1968)
[Vol. 2
NOTES
The case has applicability to general property law. Although dealing
with a special form of property, fugacious minerals, the court's rulings
were made in broad terms not limited to oil and gas. All profits a prendre
are subject to abandonment. In order to find abandonment of a granted
profit and, by analogy, of an easement, the trial court must find nonuser
plus the intent to abandon, and both must be clearly shown.
Two aspects of the problem presented by the case were not fully ex-
plored by the court. The original grants to the corporations included the
fugacious minerals and two minerals which must be mined, asphalt and
coal. By normal property definitions an interest in asphalt and coal would
be a fee interest in real property in both the possessory and corporeal
senses and hence not abandonable. In this case the court decided that the
intent of the original grantors had been to sever the profit in oil and gas.
The asphalt and coal had merely been included incidentally, so there was
no intent to establish a possessory estate in the corporeal sense. The
court decided that the grantors could not have intended to create two kinds
of estates, a possessory fee in asphalt and coal and a profit a prendre in
petroleum. It concluded that only one type of estate, the profit a prendre,
was conveyed for both the fugacious and non-fugacious minerals. There
was very little analysis of this point. The decision seems to have been
made primarily because the original conveyances were made during an oil
boom to two corporations with full corporate names indicating an interest
in oil. There is nothing in such a situation that makes it inherently im-
possible for a grantor to have intended to vest full fee rights in the solid
minerals as well as a profit in oil. Such a precedent makes uncertain
the area of grants conveying more than one mineral right.
The second problem the court left for future resolution was the effect of
conveyance not of the oil and gas profit, but of a horizontal strata con-
taining oil and gas minerals. Wil such a severed strata be considered a
possessory fee or a profit?
The future application of Gerhard to property law and to oil and gas
law should result in an answer to the unresolved questions of the case. It
should also lead to an expansion of the doctrine of abandonment. The
court said that when conflicting inferences from nonuser are present, aban-
donment should not be found. Thus it may be possible to attack a long-
dormant interest and find abandonment from nonuser alone where there
are no seriously conflicting inferences. Another mode of attack might well
derive from the nonuser in those circumstances where a renewal of use
could result only from very unsound business judgment. Although oil
and gas drilling rights are by nature speculative and therefore likely to have
long periods of nonuser, there should be available to the owner of the
(20 yrs.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704 (Supp. 1968) (10 yrs.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-
154 (Cum. Supp. 1968) §§ 55-155 (1959) (35 yrs.).
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servient estate some means to clear the title to his property after a long
period of nonuser by the dominant owner. Gerhard v. Stephens may open
such a way.
Frederica M. Sedgwick
